There is a common refrain in religious circles, sometimes smug and sometimes sincere. “If you are an atheist, you have nothing to say about morality.” Popular apologists like Frank Turek repeat it. Philosophers like William Lane Craig give it academic weight. The claim is simple: if you do not believe in God, you cannot justify moral claims. But the simplicity of the claim masks a deeper confusion, not just about atheism but about morality itself.

The is-ought problem does not go away with God #

David Hume argued that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” Facts about the world do not, on their own, generate moral obligations. This applies equally to the fact of God’s existence, if indeed he exists. “God exists” is an ontological statement. To derive moral conclusions from it, one must still introduce a normative premise: we ought to obey God.

Where does that “ought” come from?

Invoking God does not solve the is-ought problem. It merely shifts the burden. One must still use one’s own reasoning, one’s own values, to justify why divine command carries moral weight. One must endorse the premise that “God is good, and we should follow him.” Who endorses that premise? The believer does. That act of endorsement is itself a subjective act. The believer exercises personal moral judgment in order to surrender moral judgment.

The ladder one climbs to reach objective morality is built out of subjective rungs.

Faith in authority is still subjective judgment #

Consider a spectrum of moral authority:

  1. I use my own judgment to decide what is moral.
  2. I trust the judgment of a good friend.
  3. I follow the moral advice of an expert I find credible.
  4. I accept a moral code given by someone I believe everyone ought to find credible.
  5. I accept a moral code revealed by God.

Each step outsources one’s moral framework to a progressively more distant authority. But the crucial point is that in every case, the initial trust is one’s own. One is exercising judgment to decide whom or what to trust. One may call God the ultimate authority, but unless one is obeying blindly and randomly (which would be neither rational nor moral), one is making a judgment that this being is trustworthy, that this code deserves allegiance.

That judgment is subjective. So why should the fifth position count as objective morality when it merely adds metaphysical grandeur to the fourth?

What moral claims actually are #

When a moral subjectivist or atheist makes a claim like “torturing children is wrong,” they are not asserting a law written into the fabric of the universe. They are saying something different: given our shared values, such as empathy, the prevention of suffering, and human flourishing, this action contradicts those values.

This kind of moral claim is not an attempt to report an objective cosmic fact. It is a statement about what we value, and a plea to honor that common ground. This is the basis of law, democracy, and human rights. It is the foundation of every moral conversation that has changed the world.

Even religious believers rely on these shared values when defending their moral positions to those who do not share their faith. They cannot simply say “because God says so.” They must appeal to empathy, reason, and experience. They appeal to the very subjectivity they claim to transcend.

But what if someone does not share those values?

It is a fair question. What if someone does not care about empathy, fairness, or suffering? What if they reject the very foundations on which these moral appeals rest?

This is not a special problem for atheists or moral subjectivists. It is a general problem for any normative system. Sam Harris illustrates this with a pair of rhetorical questions:

“If someone does not value evidence, what evidence can you provide that they should value it? If someone does not value logical consistency, what logical argument could you offer to convince them of its importance?”

The answer is that one cannot. The moment someone opts out of the game entirely, refusing the rules of evidence, logic, or empathy, there is no argument that will compel them. But this is not a flaw in secular morality. Reason itself rests on shared commitments. If those commitments break down entirely, communication becomes impossible.

In practice, we rarely find ourselves in such a philosophical vacuum. People do care about suffering. They do respond to fairness, reciprocity, and dignity. These shared values may not be metaphysically absolute, but they are socially resilient. They form the backbone of everything from traffic laws to civil rights.

Shared values are the only ground we have to stand on. That does not make them arbitrary or fragile. It makes them human, and powerful enough to build a world.

So do atheists have nothing to say about morality? #

No one has a privileged position when it comes to moral authority, whether theist, atheist, or skeptic. The fundamental challenges of moral reasoning, such as the is-ought problem and the need to justify normative premises, apply universally.

Whether one argues that we ought to obey God or that we ought to minimize suffering, one is making a normative claim that cannot be derived from facts alone. It requires justification, and that justification must appeal to values, intuitions, or principles that others are free to question.

Everyone stands on equal footing. No worldview comes prepackaged with an unassailable foundation for morality. What matters is not whether one believes in God, but whether one can offer a coherent, persuasive case for the values one holds.

That does not render morality meaningless. It means moral discourse is a shared project, and no one is exempt from doing the work.